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Abstract
If searching for a better price becomes easier for consumers, conven-
tional wisdom suggests that pricing pressure will increase on firms, thereby
lowering prices, reducing firm profits and narrowing assortments. There
is indeed evidence that recent search facilitating technologies, such as the
Internet, have in some markets reduced prices. But there is also evidence
that firms have been able to maintain some pricing power. Furthermore,
there is evidence that the Internet has expanded variety in some markets
and this broadening of the available assortment has increased consumer wel-
fare significantly. This paper studies a model in which firms compete on
price and assortment and consumers search for products that match their
preferences at a reasonable price. Easier search does exhibit a competition
intensifying eﬀect in our model, and this eﬀect puts pressure on firms to
lower their prices and reduce assortments. But we also show that easier
search exhibits a market expansion eﬀect that encourages firms to expand
their assortment. Due to broader assortments, consumers are more likely
to find products that match their ideal preferences, improving the eﬃciency
of the market. In fact, we demonstrate that the market expansion eﬀect
can even dominate the competition intensifying eﬀect potentially leading to
higher prices, broader assortments, more profits and expanded welfare.
Keywords: search, Internet, price competition, assortment, product vari-
ety, game theory, diﬀerentiated competition.
1 Introduction
It was widely believed that the emergence of the Internet would lead to brutal price compe-
tition and an erosion of retail profit. The argument is simple and compelling: the Internet
lowers the costs consumers incur to search for goods and services, so consumers search more,
resulting in more opportunities to compare prices and ultimately more severe price compe-
tition among sellers. There is indeed some evidence that the Internet has reduced prices
in several markets (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Sorensen
2000). Nevertheless, there is also evidence that firms are able to support prices above mar-
ginal cost (e.g., Brynjolfsson, Dick and Smith 2004, Clemons, Hann and Hitt 2002, Hortacsu
and Syverson 2004).
This paper provides a simple explanation for why firms have been able to maintain at
least some pricing power and hence profits. Suppose consumers care about the price they
pay but also want to find a product or service that best matches their preferences. For
example, a shopper may know she wishes to purchase a pair of shoes but is not exactly
sure what pair she wants. Diﬀerent retailers oﬀer diﬀerent prices and diﬀerent selections
of shoes, so our shopper searches among a sample of retailers to find a suitable pair at an
acceptable price. All else being equal, the wider a store’s assortment, the more likely the
shopper will find a pair of shoes that closely matches her ideal. Although a wider assortment
increases a retailer’s demand, a wider assortment is costly (e.g., additional inventory costs,
space requirements, etc.). Lower search costs then have two eﬀects in this market. With a
lower cost to search, a consumer is likely to search more stores, so each retailer is put into
greater competition with other retailers. This competition intensifying eﬀect is precisely the
intuition behind the conventional wisdom that easier search reduces market prices. However,
if consumers search more, then each retailer eﬀectively gains access to a broader pool of
potential customers. A larger pool of potential customers allows the retailer to justify a
broader assortment. Because a larger assortment provides value to consumers, the retailer
can then support a higher price and potentially even make more profit. In other words,
when retailers choose their assortments in addition to their prices, lower search costs have
a market expansion eﬀect that dampens competition. In fact, we demonstrate that the
market expansion eﬀect can even dominate, i.e., lower search costs in a competitive market
can lead to higher prices, more industry profits, and increased consumer and social welfare.
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At the very least, the reduction in market prices and profits is not as severe as would be
predicted by considering only the competition intensifying eﬀect.
We present a model of multiple firms competing on price and assortment in which con-
sumers search for a product that best fits their needs. This novel model setup lets us study
the impact of search costs on prices, assortments, profits, and welfare. To further highlight
the distinctiveness of search’s market expansion eﬀect, we compare the influence of search
with the influence of firm entry.
2 Literature Review
Bakos (1997) and Anderson and Renault (1999) study search among diﬀerentiated single-
product firms with exogenous diﬀerentiation. They find that easier search leads to lower
equilibrium prices, corresponding, again, to the intuition that cheaper search intensifies price
competition. Anderson and Renault (1999) find that equilibrium prices increase with the
diversity of consumers’ tastes. Despite this relationship, we note that easier search in
their model continues to lower prices. In our model firms have a second strategic decision
(their assortment breadth) that yields our qualitatively diﬀerent conclusions. Klemperer
(1992) studies a duopoly model where each firm oﬀers a line of products, but the number
of products carried by each firm is exogenous, whereas assortment breadth is endogenous in
our model.
There is an extensive empirical literature that measures the impact of search on market
dynamics. (See Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2005 for a review.) For example, Brynjolfsson,
Hu, and Smith (2003) estimate the economic impact of increased product variety in online
bookstores and show that consumer welfare has increased significantly more by broader
assortments than by increased competition or lower prices. Our theoretical conclusions are
consistent with their findings: easier search in a competitive equilibrium can lead to broader
assortments and reasonably stable prices.
Several recent papers develop theoretical models to explain why easier search may not
lead to excessive price competition. Lal and Sarvary (1999) argue that the Internet reduces
consumer search costs for digital attributes of a product (such as its price and dimension)
but not for non-digital attributes (such as how well it fits, in the case of clothing). This
eﬀectively increases a consumer’s cost to search, so prices can rise. In an experimental
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study, Lynch and Ariely (2000) consider separately the ease of searching for price or quality
information. They find that as quality information becomes easier to search, then consumers
are less price sensitive. We assume consumers incur a single cost to learn each firm’s price
and product attributes. Most closely related to this paper is Kuksov (2004). Similar to
our paper Kuksov establishes the counter-intuitive result that average prices can increase if
search costs decrease. Despite this similar result, because our model set-up is quite diﬀerent,
we obtain diﬀerent results and empirical predications concerning profits, assortments and
welfare. We summarize these diﬀerences at the end of Section 5.
3 Model
There are n risk neutral multi-product firms who each oﬀers a set of diﬀerentiated products
within the same category to a market of risk neutral consumers. Firms simultaneously
choose their prices and assortment. (Our qualitative results continue to hold if firms choose
assortments first and then prices.)1 Consumers then shop among firms and either choose to
purchase one unit of a product from one firm or to abstain from purchasing (the no-purchase
option). We normalize the consumer population to one (w.l.o.g.).
We study two variants of consumer search in our model, parallel and sequential search.
(These are the common two variants in the search literature, see Baye, Morgan and Scholten
2005.) Both variants reflect the presence of search costs, yet they diﬀer in the process with
which consumers search. (Search can be costly even in electronic markets: e.g., Hann and
Terwiesch 2003 show that consumers value the dis-utility of an online search activity at
about $5 per search.) In the case of parallel search, consumers sample a fixed number of
firms and then purchase their most preferred product among the firms searched, which might
be the no-purchase option. With sequential search, consumers visit firms sequentially and
decide after each visit whether to purchase an item, continue their search at another firm or
to purchase nothing. We suspect other search models are qualitatively a mixture of these
two extremes, and they are analytically more cumbersome.
In both models firms set their prices and assortments to maximize their expected profit
given consumer shopping behavior and consumers choose a search strategy to maximize
1 See online technical appendix for details.
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their utility given the price and assortment decisions of the firms. We focus on symmetric
equilibria throughout the paper.
Our consumer choice process is based on the multinomial logit (MNL) model (see Ander-
son, de Palma and Thisse 1992). The basic form of the model works as follows. A consumer
considers whether to purchase one unit from a set of products, S, or to purchase nothing,
product 0, which we also call the no-purchase option. Let Uj be the consumer’s utility from
product j, j ∈ S ∪{0}: Uj = (uj− pj)+ ζj, where uj is a constant, pj is the price of product
j (p0 = 0), and ζj is a random variable with a zero-mean Gumbel distribution and variance
π2µ2/6, where µ is a scale parameter. Let F (x) and f(x) be the distribution and density
functions of ζj and γ is Euler’s constant,
F (x) = exp[− exp(−(x/µ+ γ))].
A consumer chooses the product with the highest realized utility. Let qj(S ∪ {0}) be the
probability a consumer chooses product j given the choice set. It is well known that
qj(S ∪ {0}) = Pr(Uj = max{Ui, i ∈ S ∪ {0}}) = exp((uj − pj) /µ)X
j∈S
exp((ui − pi) /µ) + exp(u0/µ)
. (1)
It follows from (1) that demand for product j decreases as more products are added to the
consumer’s choice set: qj(S) > qj(S+), ∀j ∈ S ⊂ S+.
Let Uik be a consumer’s utility associated with firm k’s ith product, i ≥ 0: Uik = (uik −
pik) + ζik. We assume that all actual products are equally likely to be preferred, adjusting
for any price diﬀerences: for all i ≥ 1 and k, ζik = ζ and uik = 0 (normalized to zero
w.l.o.g.). For the no-purchase product we choose u0k = u0 and p0k = p0 = 0 (normalized to
zero w.l.o.g.). MNL based models have been widely used in empirical research on product
variety/assortment related issues in both economics (e.g., Watson 2004) and marketing (e.g.,
Draganska and Jain 2005, 2006).
In our model, each firm oﬀers a unique set of products (i.e., each firm is the exclusive
provider of its assortment). This is appropriate in a market with substantial variety and
diﬀuse preferences, such as women’s shoes, eyeglasses, apparel, ceramic tiles, antiques, paint-
ings, bicycles or paperback romance novels, among others. We feel our qualitative results
should continue to hold even if firms have overlapping assortments. But overlapping assort-
ments require modeling consumer expectations for how assortments overlap and how those
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expectations influence consumer search. Intuitively, the greater the overlap in assortments
across firms, the lower the value of consumer search to find a suitable product. Therefore,
in our model the value of search to consumers is maximized.
Because all products have the same probability of appealing to a consumer, it can be
shown that it is optimal for each firm k to choose the same price for all of its products2,
pk, (e.g., Shugan (1989) indicates that the majority of flavors within a product line are sold
at the same price in the ice cream industry.) and the firm’s assortment decision amounts
to choosing the number of products to oﬀer, xk. For analytical simplicity, throughout this
paper we treat xk as a continuous variable. We assume each firm purchases each product
for the same marginal cost (normalized to zero) but variety is costly from an operational
perspective. In particular, let c(x) be a firm’s operational costs when it carries x products,
c(0) = 0, c0(x) ≥ 0 and c00(x) ≥ 0.
In summary, we present an oligopoly model with n firms that provide an assortment of
diﬀerentiated product variants to a set of consumers that may or may not purchase a unit
(i.e. consumers have a no-purchase option). This model setup is distinct from the duopoly
model presented by Kuksov (2004). Kuksov studies two firms that sell a single product
variant to a set of consumers that purchase one unit with certainty (i.e., they do not have a
no-purchase option).
4 Competition with Parallel Search
In this section consumers sample firms in parallel: each consumer a priori commits to search
m firms. The consumer observes the product oﬀerings of m randomly selected firms and
then purchases the product that maximizes utility net price, which may be the no-purchase
option. The consumer incurs a search cost of τ per firm included in the search, for a total
search cost of mτ.3 Consumer choose m to maximize their expected utility conditional on
the expectation that firms choose a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., each consumer expects each
2 See the online technical appendix for details on the optimality of identical pricing
in an assortment.
3 This model can be extended to the case that the cost of searching m firms is a convex
and increasing function of m.
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of the n firms to choose price p∗ and assortment x∗. Naturally, each consumer makes an
optimal purchase decision given the actual prices and assortments observed in the m chosen
firms.
A parallel search strategy is appropriate if there is some lag to receive information from
firms, such as requesting catalogs from several mail-order firms, or if consumers use a simple
search heuristic that commits them to a fixed number of searches (e.g., “obtain price quotes
from three insurance companies before choosing one”). Our parallel search model is analo-
gous to the consideration set theory of consumer choice in the consumer behavior literature
(e.g., Howard and Sheth 1969, Roberts and Lattin 1991). Consideration set theory posits
that consumers first decide which brands/options to include in a consideration set and then
they choose the best alternative among their pre-specified set.
Firms choose their prices and assortments optimally given their expectation of m. A
symmetric equilibrium in this setting is a 3-tuple, {p∗, x∗,m∗}, such that consumers have no
incentive to deviate from their search strategy and no firm has an incentive to deviate from
its price and assortment strategy.
A consumer’s search strategy maximizes U(m), a consumer’s expected net utility of search-
ing m firms,
max
1≤m≤n
U(m) = −p∗ + µ lnm+ µ lnx∗ −mτ,
where U(m) follows from the properties of the Gumbel distribution and the MNL model (p.
60, Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992). The solution to the consumer’s problem is
m∗ = min
h
n,max
³
1,
µ
τ
´i
, (2)
where we treat m as a continuous variable. The consumer’s optimal search sample size, m∗,
is decreasing in the search cost τ and is independent of p∗ and x∗.4
Now consider the firms’ pricing and assortment decisions. Let {pi, xi} be firm i’s choices
and {p, x} be firm i’s expectation for the choices of the other firms, where recall firm i expects
the other firms to follow a symmetric equilibrium. Conditional that firm i is included in a
4 This convenient result is obtained because the consumer’s maximum utility is the
log of a multiplicative term that includes the number of products and price. Hence,
m separates from both x∗ and p∗.
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consumer’s search, that consumer purchases from firm i with probability
qi(pi, xi|p, x,m∗) = xi exp(−pi/µ)xi exp(−pi/µ) + (m∗ − 1)x exp(−p/µ) + exp(u0/µ) . (3)
Although a consumer expects all firms to choose p∗ and x∗, (3) implies that a consumer
makes an optimal choice given the actual prices and assortments observed.
Our model of each firm’s market share, qi(·), is similar to the share equations in the
literature on market-share models, but there are some important diﬀerences (Basuroy and
Nguyen 1998; Bell, Keeney and Little 1975; Gruca, Kumar and Sudharshan 1992; Gruca and
Sudharshan 1991; Karnani, 1985; Monahan 1987). Those models express firm i’s sales as
SALESi =
Ã
Ai
Ai +
P
j 6=iAj
!
× SIZE
³X
Ai
´
,
where Ai is the attractiveness of firm i and SIZE(A) is the total sales in the market, which
is possibly an increasing function of the firms’ total attraction. Our model fixes the total
potential sales of the market and each firm’s share of that total potential depends on the sum
of the firms’ attractions plus the attraction of the no-purchase option (i.e., the adjustment
for market size in our model is in the denominator rather than in the numerator). Existence
of equilibrium can be an issue in market share models based on the MNL (Basuroy and
Nguyen 1998; Gruca and Sudharshan 1991), but existence is not an issue in our model even
though our model is also based on the MNL.5
Firm i’s expected profit is
Πi(pi, xi|p, x,m∗) = pi
µ
m∗
n
¶
qi(pi, xi|p, x,m∗)− c(xi) (4)
because m∗/n is the probability firm i is included in a consumer’s random sample of m∗
5 Previous research derives each firm’s attractiveness score to be of the form aieαipieβixi,
where ai, αi and βi are constants, pi is the firm’s price and mi is its expenditure on a
marketing variable (such as advertising or service). Price enters into our attractiveness in
the same way, but our additional strategic variable, the number of products oﬀered,
is in linear form, xi, rather than exponential form, eβixi , which is the key diﬀerence.
Equilibrium existence does not appear to be an issue with multiplicative competitive
interaction (MCI) models. Those models have attractiveness of the form aip−αi x
β
i , which is
similar to our form with respect to xi, but diﬀerent with respect to price.
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firms. The next result establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. All
proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 1 In the parallel search model there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium,
{p∗, x∗,m∗}. If c0(0) < µ2/(nτ exp(1 + u0/µ)), then
m∗ = min
h
n,max
³
1,
µ
τ
´i
and p∗ and x∗ are implicitly defined by the following:
p∗ =
µ2
µ− (n/m∗)x∗c0(x∗) , (5)
x∗ =
µ
nc0(x∗)
− exp ((u0 + p
∗) /µ)
m∗
. (6)
Otherwise, p∗ = µ, m∗ = 0, x∗ = 0.
Proposition 2 In the parallel search model (assuming an equilibrium with positive assort-
ments), while firm entry reduces both product variety, x∗, and price, p∗, easier search in-
creases product variety, x∗, and does not necessarily reduce price, p∗. Specifically, if c0(x) = c
for some constant c, then there exists some threshold τ¯ such that easier search (decreasing τ)
increases the equilibrium price when τ > τ¯ , otherwise easier search decreases the equilibrium
price. Furthermore, while firm entry may not always increase the total market variety nx∗,
easier search always does.
The eﬀects of firm entry are consistent with the existing literature: firm entry lowers both
equilibrium price and product variety and may not necessarily increase the total variety
in the market. This is due to the competition intensifying eﬀect of firm entry: a more
crowded market results in more competition, which shrinks market-share (m∗/n), which
reduces each firm’s incentive to invest in variety. Furthermore, with less product variety and
more competitors, firms must reduce prices.
The eﬀects of search, on the other hand, are quite diﬀerent than those of firm entry. For
example, easier search raises the equilibrium product variety x∗ and the total product variety
in the market nx∗. As the search cost, τ , decreases, consumers are more likely to expand their
search of firms before making a final purchase decision. Consequently, easier search pressures
firms to compete for the patronage of a consumer with a greater number of competitors. This
is similar to firm entry: easier search leads to more competition in the market, which induces
firms to reduce their variety. This competition intensifying eﬀect of easier search is identified
in the choice probability (3): everything else equal, a higher value of m∗ (which is caused by
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easier search) results in lower qi(pi, xi|p, x,m∗). But easier search has an additional eﬀect on
market dynamics: when consumers search more actively, a firm gains access to (in the sense
of “is being visited by”) more consumers, i.e., an increase inm∗ also increases them∗/n term
in the objective function (4). The overall eﬀect of easier search on the equilibrium product
oﬀering depends on the relative strength of these two eﬀects. According to Proposition 2,
in the case of parallel search, the market expansion eﬀect of easier search always dominates
the competition intensifying eﬀect, i.e., (m∗/n)qi(pi, xi|p, x,m∗) is increasing in m∗. Hence,
overall, easier search raises the equilibrium assortment of each firm and the total assortment
in the market.
Proposition 2 also indicates that the market price may actually increase as search becomes
easier (i.e., as τ decreases). This result is in sharp contrast to the conventional economic
view that increased competition leads to a lower market price (e.g., Bakos 1997, Anderson
and Renault 1999). Prices may rise because firms oﬀer more variety, thereby generating
greater consumer welfare that allows the firms to support higher prices. It can be shown
that when the variety cost function is linear, there exists a key threshold, m, that determines
the influence of search on prices. When the search cost is suﬃciently high thatm∗ < m, then
a decrease in the search cost increases equilibrium prices: with a high search cost the firms
oﬀer minimal variety, so a marginal expansion in variety creates a significant improvement
in consumer welfare. When the search cost is already low, such that m∗ > m, then further
expansion in variety does not increase consumer welfare enough to increase price. This
result implies that poorly served markets (because of limited variety and high search costs)
are likely to support price increases when technology is implemented to reduce search costs.
Proposition 3 In the parallel search model, while firm entry reduces the equilibrium firm
profit, easier search does not necessarily reduce the equilibrium firm profit. If the equilibrium
price increases as the search cost decreases, then the firms’ equilibrium profit increases.
So firm entry indeed always reduces the firms’ equilibrium profit, because the operating
cost savings of less product variety are not enough to compensate for the revenue loss due to
a lower price and market share. However, easier search may not necessarily lead to a profit
decline: when easier search increases the equilibrium price, the revenue increase driven by a
higher price oﬀsets the cost increase associated with higher product variety, and equilibrium
profit increases. (Note, this is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition: it is possible for
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equilibrium profits to increase even if equilibrium prices decrease.)
Proposition 4 In the parallel search model, while firm entry does not necessarily increase
consumer and social welfare, easier search always increases consumer welfare and can in-
crease social welfare.
Proposition 4 indicates that the social welfare (consumer welfare and industry profit)
can increase as search becomes easier. More striking, Proposition 4 reveals that consumers
always benefit from lower search costs even if prices rise because broader assortments generate
suﬃciently higher utilities to outweigh any welfare loss due to higher prices. Furthermore,
we find that firm entry may neither benefit consumers nor society as a whole. These results
are consistent with Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith (2003) who find that the consumer welfare
gain from increased product variety available through electronic markets is significant and
between 7 and 10 times as large as the gain from the increased number of competitors.
5 Competition with Sequential Search
With sequential search, upon observing a firm’s oﬀerings a consumer decides among three
options: (1) purchase a product, (2) incur a search cost τ and engage in further search, or
(3) discontinue the search process. As with parallel search, we assume consumers anticipate
a symmetric equilibrium (each firm chooses price p∗ and assortment x∗).
Suppose a consumer is visiting firm i with price pi and her utility of the best product
oﬀered by firm i is y. Given her expectation of {p, x}, it is worthwhile for the consumer with
search cost τ to search another firm who oﬀers x products with price p instead of purchasing
the current best product if the expected value of search is greater than the search cost τ ,
i.e., Z ∞
y−pi+p
(φ− (y − pi + p))dH(φ, x) ≥ τ , (7)
where H(φ, x) is the CDF of the maximum utility of x products and
H(φ, x) = exp
·
−x exp
µ
−
µ
φ
µ
+ γ
¶¶¸
.
As the left-hand side of (7) is decreasing in the term y − pi + p there exists a threshold
U¯(x, τ) for any given x and τ such that the consumer will choose to search another firm if
y − pi + p ≤ U¯(x, τ). Also, from (7), note that U¯(x, τ) is increasing in x and decreasing
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in τ . Weitzman (1979) shows that this threshold search strategy is the optimal sequential
search strategy.
The following Lemma establishes a useful property of the search threshold.
Lemma 5 H(U¯(x, τ), x) is independent of x, where U¯(x, τ) is the smallest y such that the
inequality (7) strictly holds.
Based on Lemma 5, we write H(U¯(x, τ), x) as H(τ) whenever it is convenient. Define
ρ (x, τ) = exp(−
¡
U¯(x, τ)/µ+ γ
¢
). Because H(U¯(x, τ), x) = exp[−xρ (x, τ)], Lemma 5
implies that xρ (x, τ) is also independent of x. Furthermore, H(τ) is decreasing in τ and
ρ (x, τ) is increasing in τ .
We assume that consumers observe their no-purchase utility first. As a result, a consumer
visits at least one firm only if her no-purchase utility is lower than U¯(x, τ)− p. Therefore,
H0(U¯(x, τ)− p) is the fraction of consumers that actually enter the market, where H0 is the
CDF of the no-purchase utility and
H0(φ) = exp
·
− exp
µ
−
µ
φ− u0
µ
+ γ
¶¶¸
.
A symmetric equilibrium in this setting is a 3-tuple, {p∗, x∗, U¯(x∗, τ)}, such that consumers
have no incentive to deviate from their search strategy and no firm has an incentive to deviate
from its price and assortment strategy given their expectations. Suppose firm i’s choices are
{pi, xi} and all other firms’ choices are {p, x}. If a consumer visits firm i, the probability she
purchases at firm i is 1−H(U¯(x, τ) + (pi − p) , xi), otherwise she is equally likely to choose
among the firms that have not been visited. The probability that firm i is visited first is
1/n and, obviously, the probability it is not visited first is (n− 1)/n. If firm i is not visited
first, then with probability H(τ) the consumer does not purchase at the first firm and visits
firm i in her next search with probability 1/(n− 1). Thus, the probability that firm i is the
second firm in the consumer’s search is:µ
n− 1
n
¶
H(τ)
µ
1
n− 1
¶
=
H(τ)
n
.
In general, the probability a consumer eventually visits firm i is
nX
j=1
H(τ)j−1
j
=
1
n
µ
1−H(τ)n
1−H(τ)
¶
. (8)
Hence, with probability H(U¯(x, τ)+(pi − p) , xi)H(τ)n−1 a consumer will visit all n firms
in the market and still cannot find a product (including the no-purchase option) that has a
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higher utility than her search threshold U¯(x, τ). In our analysis we assume this probability
is small, i.e., H(U¯(x, τ) + (pi − p) , xi)H(τ)n−1 ≈ 0, which also implies that the probability
(8) is approximately equal to
1
n (1−H(τ)) .
This is a mild assumption as long as the total assortment in the market is reasonably large
and the number of firms is not too small.
Thus, the probability a consumer visits firm i and also makes a purchase from firm i is
qi(pi, xi|p, x, τ) =
H0(U¯(x, τ)− p)
£
1−H(U¯(x, τ) + (pi − p), xi)
¤
n [1−H(τ)] . (9)
Firm i’s expected profit is
Πi(pi, xi|p, x, τ) = piqi(pi, xi|p, x, τ)− c(xi). (10)
The following proposition establishes, under a relatively mild condition (e.g., which holds for
linear and quadratic c(x)), the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium for our sequential
search model.
Proposition 6 Define
g(x) =
c0(x) + xc00 (x)
x2
.
If g(x) is decreasing in x, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the sequential search
model, {p∗, x∗, U¯(x∗, τ)}, where U¯(x∗, τ), p∗, and x∗ are implicitly defined by the following:Z ∞
U¯(x∗,τ)
(φ− U¯(x∗, τ))dH(φ, x∗) = τ , (11)
p∗ =
µ [1−H(τ)]
x∗ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)
, (12)
and
x∗ =
µH0(U¯(x∗, τ)− p∗)
nc0(x∗)
. (13)
Proposition 7 In the sequential search model, while firm entry reduces product variety, x∗,
and leaves price, p∗, unchanged, easier search raises x∗ and reduces p∗. Furthermore, firm
entry may not always increase the total variety available in the market, nx∗, while easier
search always does.
The qualitative findings of the sequential search model are consistent with those of the
parallel search model. For example, while firm entry reduces the equilibrium product variety,
easier search increases the equilibrium product variety and the total market variety. Again,
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the diﬀerence between easier search and firm entry is driven by the market expansion eﬀect
of easier search. However, in the sequential search model, the market expansion eﬀect of
easier search is not strong enough to elicit an increase in the equilibrium price. (But price
competition is not as severe as it would be without the market expansion eﬀect.)
Proposition 8 In the sequential search model, while firm entry reduces the equilibrium firm
profit, easier search does not necessarily reduce the equilibrium firm profit. If the consumers’
expected no-purchase utility u0 is suﬃciently high, easier search increases equilibrium profit.
As Proposition 8 shows, firm entry still reduces the firms’ profits in equilibrium. This
occurs for two reasons. First, because firms respond to new entry by reducing product
variety and maintaining prices, the market as a whole is less attractive to consumers. As a
result, fewer consumers enter the market. Second, each firm’s market share falls post-entry.
Although prices stay unchanged, the firms’ demand post-entry decreases enough to lead to
lower revenues and profits.
In contrast, Proposition 8 indicates that although easier search cannot elicit an increase
in the equilibrium price, it can still lead to a profit increase, especially when the consumers’
expected no-purchase utility u0 is large. When u0 is large, consumers are less likely to enter
the market to search firms at all. In this scenario, the market expansion eﬀect of easier
search on the whole market (the term H0(U¯(x, τ) − p) in (9)), becomes stronger and more
important to the firms’ profitability. If u0 is suﬃciently large, this expansion of the total
market size caused by easier search outweighs the price decline and the increase in product
variety costs.
Proposition 9 In the sequential search model, while firm entry reduces consumer welfare
and does not necessarily increase social welfare, easier search always increases both consumer
and social welfare.
The qualitative findings of the sequential search model concerning welfare are consistent
with those of the parallel search model. Thus, the market expansion eﬀect and its impact
on assortments, profits, and welfare is robust to the consumer search model. Since the
eﬀect of easier search on price diﬀers in the parallel and sequential models, we conclude that
the eﬀect of easier search on assortments, profits, and welfare is stronger than the eﬀect on
prices.
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There are subtle diﬀerences between the parallel and sequential search models, but the
complexity of the MNL functional forms make a detailed comparison of the two models
diﬃcult. However, for a given search cost, we can show that consumers search more in
the sequential model than in parallel model conditional that they choose to search, i.e.,
E[N | N > 0] > m∗, where N is the number of firms searched in the sequential model.
Furthermore, ∂m∗/∂τ ≤ ∂E[N |N > 0]/∂τ < 0, i.e., the amount of search in the parallel
model is more sensitive to a change in the search cost than in the sequential model. Thus, a
reduction in the search cost τ generates a greater increase in search with parallel search than
with sequential search, thereby leading to a greater expansion in assortment. If initially τ
is suﬃciently high, then the expansion of the assortment in the parallel model is suﬃciently
great to support a price increase, whereas in the sequential search model the expansion of
the assortment is never enough to lead to an increase in the equilibrium price. Independent
of search mode, as search costs decrease, consumers search more in equilibrium.
In summary, we find that lower search costs (a) lead to an increase in industry sales (the
market size expansion eﬀect, consumers who abstained from purchase when faced with high
search costs enter the market when search costs decrease), (b) lead to broader assortments
(c) can increase social welfare, (d) can make consumers better oﬀ, even if prices increase, (e)
increase search activity in equilibrium, (f) increase industry profit even if prices decrease,
and (g) can increase profits for all firms. Our findings complement the work by Kuksov
(2004), who - in a diﬀerent model setup, finds that lower search costs (a) do not change
overall industry sales (every consumer buys one unit as there is no no-purchase option), (b)
do not lead to a change in assortment (as there is only one product variant in the market),
(c) do not increase social welfare, (d) make consumers worse oﬀ if prices are increased, (e) do
not lead to any search activity in equilibrium (i.e. every consumer visits exactly one firm),
(f) increase industry profit only if prices increase, and (g) may increase industry profits but
one of the two firms is always worse oﬀ, i.e., easier search will benefit one firm at the expense
of the other.
6 Conclusion
Our work explores multiproduct firms’ decision making and profitability in the presence of
changing search costs or firm entry. In our model firm entry intensifies competition, resulting
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in less variety, lower prices and lower profits. Easier search (modeled as a lower search cost)
also intensifies competition, as suggested by conventional wisdom (e.g., Bakos 1997). But
we demonstrate that easier search also has a market expansion eﬀect: if consumers search
more, then a firm has access to more consumers. Due to this market expansion eﬀect, which
is not present with firm entry, firms in equilibrium invest in broader assortments. With more
products to choose from, consumers are more likely to find products that match their ideal
preferences, increasing the eﬃciency of the market which manifests itself in higher prices,
more profits and increased welfare.
The advent of the Internet has clearly motivated the recent interest on the influence
of search on market dynamics. Our results, as we have already stated, are consistent
with an expansion of variety due to (in part) easier search associated with Internet enabled
markets. But our results are not specific to any one technology - our model suggests
that any technology that reduces search costs should expand the available assortment in
a market. For example, according to our model, the development of better roads (e.g.,
pavement), telecommunications (e.g., telephone) and transportations (e.g., automobiles) in
the early part of the last century should have contributed to larger retail formats (broader
assortments). The Internet represents only the latest technological advancement in this
trend.
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7 Appendix
Outlines of proofs are provided in this appendix. See the on-line technical appendix for more
details.
Proof of Proposition 1: To simplify notation, we use the following abbreviations: Πi =
Πi(pi, xi|p, x,m∗) and qi = qi(pi, xi|p, x,m∗) and
qi =
xi
xi + a(pi)
; a(pi) =
(m∗ − 1)x exp(−p/µ) + exp(u0/µ)
exp(−pi/µ)
.
Diﬀerentiate (4) to obtain the following first order conditions:
(m∗/n) qi − (m∗/n) pi (1− qi) qi/µ = 0
(m∗/n) pi (1− qi) qi
xi
− c0(xi) = 0
Note, firm i optimizes pi and xi given an expectation that consumers will search m∗ firms
and the other firms will choose {p, x}. A symmetric equilibrium then requires that the
firms and consumers have correct expectations regarding everyone’s behavior and behavior
is optimal given these expectations. Simplification of the first order conditions yield (5)
and (6). Evaluation of the Hession determines that this solution is indeed a maximum. The
symmetric equilibrium is unique because the first order conditions have a unique solution
(and hence the only candidate equilibrium). The condition on c0(0) ensures an interior
equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: The right hand side of (6) is decreasing in n, so x∗ is decreasing
in n. From (5), p∗ is increasing in x∗, so p∗ is decreasing in n as well. It is straightforward
to show that nx∗ can be decreasing in n when c(x) = cx. It is not diﬃcult to verify that the
right-hand side of (6) is increasing in m∗, so x∗ is increasing inm∗. Becausem∗ is decreasing
in the consumer search cost τ , easier search increases x∗.
To illustrate that easier search can increase p∗, assume c(x) = cx. The equilibrium price
is then implicitly defined by
p∗ − µ
2m2
µm2 − µm+ nce(
uo+p∗
µ )
= 0
Define pˆ such that
2nce(
uo+pˆ
µ ) = µm.
Note that ∂pˆ/∂m > 0. From the implicit function theorem, the sign of ∂p∗/∂m is positive
if p∗ > pˆ, otherwise it is negative. It can be shown that there is a unique m¯ such that
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p∗ = pˆ = µm¯(m¯ − 1/2). It follows that ∂p∗ (m¯) /∂m = 0. Hence, for all m < m¯, pˆ < p∗,
which implies ∂p∗/∂m > 0. Furthermore, for all m > m¯, pˆ > p∗, which implies ∂p∗/∂m < 0.
Thus, for suﬃciently high search costs, m∗ < m, and the equilibrium price is increasing as
search becomes easier (as m∗ increases) and for suﬃciently low search costs, m∗ > m and
the equilibrium price is decreasing as search becomes easier (as m∗ continues to increases).¥
Proof of Proposition 3: Diﬀerentiate the firm’s equilibrium profit with respect to n:
∂Π∗
∂n
=
(µm∗ − nx∗c0(x∗)) ∂x∗
∂n
[µm∗xc00(x) + nx∗c0(x∗)2] + µm∗x∗c0(x∗)∂(nx
∗c0(x∗))
∂n
(µm∗ − nx∗c0(x∗))2
< 0.
To ensure p∗ ≥ 0, we must have µm∗−nx∗c0(x∗) ≥ 0. Because p∗ is decreasing in n, nx∗c0(x∗)
must be decreasing in n. Together with the convexity of c(x∗) and ∂x∗/∂n < 0, the inequality
follows.
Diﬀerentiating the firm’s equilibrium profit with respect to m∗:
∂Π∗
∂m∗
=
µnx∗c0(x∗)
h
m∗ (c0(x∗) + x∗c00(x∗)) ∂x
∗
∂m∗ − x∗c0(x∗) +
c0(x∗)(µm∗−nx∗c0(x∗))
µ
∂x∗
∂m∗
i
(µm∗ − nx∗c0(x∗))2
. (14)
The above derivative cannot be signed unambiguously. Diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to
m∗ and collecting terms, we have
∂p∗
∂m∗
=
µ2n
£
m∗ (c0(x∗) + x∗c00(x∗)) ∂x
∗
∂m∗ − x∗c0(x∗)
¤
(µm∗ − nx∗c0(x∗))2
.
The sign of ∂p∗/∂m∗ is determined by the sign of the term in the square brackets in the
numerator, which is the same as the first term in the square brackets in the numerator of
(14). As we discussed above, the second term in the square brackets in the numerator of
(14) is always positive. Therefore, if ∂p∗/∂m∗ ≥ 0, it is suﬃcient to ensure ∂Π∗/∂m∗ ≥ 0.
This implies that if easier search leads to a price increase in the market, it will surely increase
the equilibrium firm profit as well. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: In the parallel search model, equilibrium consumer welfare is
CW = µ ln [m∗x∗ exp (−p∗/µ) + exp (u0/µ)]−m∗τ ,
where the first term is the expected utility of searching m∗ firms, which is the expected
value of the maximum of the utilities of the no-purchase option and m∗x∗ products with
price p∗ oﬀered by m∗ firms, and the second term is the cost of searching m∗ firms. Since
m∗ = min
£
n,max
¡
1, µ
τ
¢¤
, m∗τ is non-increasing in τ . Thus, the sign of ∂CW/∂m∗ is
the same as the sign of ∂ (µ lnm∗x∗ − p∗) /∂m∗. Diﬀerentiating, we find that to show
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∂ (µ lnm∗x∗ − p∗) /∂m∗ ≥ 0, it is suﬃcient to show ∂p∗
∂m∗ ≤ µ/m∗. Diﬀerentiating (6) and
using ∂x
∗
∂m∗ ≥ 0, we find
∂p∗
∂m∗ ≤ µ/m∗ is true. Thus, consumer welfare always increases as
search costs decrease. The social welfare in the parallel search model is the sum of consumer
welfare and the total profit for all n firms. Since we have shown that equilibrium firm profit
can increase as search costs decrease in Proporsition 3, the social welfare also can increase.
Numerical studies show that both consumer and social welfare is not monotone in n, i.e.,
firm entry may reduce or increase consumer and social welfare.¥
Proof of Lemma 5: To show H(U¯(x, τ), x) = exp
£
−x exp
¡
−
¡
U¯(x, τ)/µ+ γ
¢¢¤
is inde-
pendent of x, it is suﬃcient to show the term in the square bracket is independent of x.
Diﬀerentiating the term with respect to x, we have
∂
£
x exp
¡
−
¡
U¯(x, τ)/µ+ γ
¢¢¤
∂x
= exp
¡
−
¡
U¯(x, τ)/µ+ γ
¢¢ ·
x− 1
µ
∂U¯(x, τ)
∂x
¸
.
Thus, we just need to show that ∂U¯(x, τ)/∂x = µ/x. Note that U¯(x, τ) is the solution of
the following equation
Ψ(x) =
Z ∞
U¯(x,τ)
(φ− U¯(x, τ))dH(φ, x) = τ .
Diﬀerentiating by using Leibnitz’s Rule and Implicit Function Theorem, we have
∂U¯(x, τ)
∂x
= −
³µ
x
´ Z ∞
U¯(x,τ)
∂[(φ−U¯(x,τ))h(φ,x)]
∂φ
dφ−
Z ∞
U¯(x,τ)
h(φ, x)dφZ ∞
U¯(x,τ)
h(φ, x)dφ
=
µ
x
,
since
Z ∞
U¯(x,τ)
∂[[φ−U¯(x,τ)]h(φ,x)]
∂φ
dφ =
£
φ− U¯(x, τ)
¤
h(φ, x)
¯¯∞
U¯(x,τ)
= 0.¥
Proof of Proposition 6: Let ρ(pi − p, x, τ) = exp(−(
¡
U¯(x, τ) + (pi − p))/µ+ γ
¢
). To
simplify notation, we use the following abbreviations: ρ(pi) = ρ(pi − p, x, τ), H(x) =
H(U¯(x, τ), x) and H(pi, xi) = H(U¯(x, τ) + (pi − p) , xi). Furthermore, let
A =
H0(U¯(x, τ) + p)
n
¡
1−H(U¯(x, τ), x)
¢ , and Qi = [1−H(pi, xi)] .
Diﬀerentiating (10) to obtain the following first order conditions:
AQi + piA
∂Qi
∂pi
= 0,
piA
∂Qi
∂xi
− c0(xi) = 0.
Because for any symmetric equilibrium {p∗, x∗} there exists a unique U¯(x∗, τ) satisfying
(11), it is suﬃcient to show the existence and uniqueness of a {p∗, x∗} equilibrium for a
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given U¯(·). To prove existence of the equilibrium we show that firm i’s expected profit
function (10) is jointly quasi-concave in {pi, xi}. To establish uniqueness, we show if function
g (x) = (c0(x) + xc00(x)) /x2 is decreasing in x, there exists a unique positive {p∗, x∗} that
solves the first-order conditions of all firms simultaneously.¥
We need the following lemma for the proof of Proposition 7.
Lemma 10 For a given x, ρ(x, τ)H(τ)/ (1−H(τ)) is decreasing in τ .
Proof. Define functions K(ω) = exp (−x exp (−ω)), where x is a constant, and T (ω) =
exp (−ω)K (ω) / (1−K (ω)). Thus,K 0(ω) = x exp (−ω)K(ω) and T (ω) = K 0(ω)/ (x (1−K (ω))).
We then have
T 0(ω) =
x exp (−ω)K (ω) [x exp (−ω) + exp (−x exp (−ω))− 1]
x (1−K (ω))2
≥ 0.
The inequality follows from the fact that function f() =  + exp (−) − 1 is convex and
minimized at  = 0 with f(0) = 0. Therefore, T (ω) is an increasing function. The lemma
follows from ρ(x, τ)H(τ)/ (1−H(τ)) = T
¡
U¯(x, τ)/µ+ γ
¢
and U¯(x, τ) is decreasing in τ .¥
Proof of Proposition 7: From (12), it is clearly that p∗ is independent of n. Condition
(13) can be written as
w(x∗) = x∗c0(x∗)− µ
n
H0(U¯(x∗, τ)− p∗) = 0. (15)
Because w(x∗) is increasing in n and quasi-convex with w(0) = 0, x∗, which is the unique
positive solution of (15), is decreasing in n. To illustrate the possibility that nx∗ can be
decreasing in n, consider a linear cost function c(x) = cx with c0(x) = c. For this linear
cost function, defining υ∗ = nx∗ and multiplying both sides of equation (15) by n, it yields
cυ∗−µH0(U¯(υ∗/n, τ)− p∗) = 0. Since the right-hand side of the equation is quasi-convex in
υ∗ and increasing in n, υ∗ = nx∗, which is the unique positive solution of the above equation,
is decreasing in n. By Lemma 10, ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)/ (1−H(τ)) is decreasing in the search cost
τ . Thus, from (12), p∗ is increasing in τ . Because w(x∗) in condition (15) is increasing in
τ and quasi-convex with w(0) = 0, x∗ is decreasing in τ .¥
Proof of Proposition 8: Diﬀerentiating the firm’s equilibrium profit with respect to n and
arranging terms, we have
∂Π∗
∂n
=
µ
1−H(τ)− x∗ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)
x∗ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)
¶
c0(x∗)
∂x∗
∂n
+
[1−H(τ)]x∗c00(x∗)
x∗ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)
∂x∗
∂n
≤ 0.
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The inequality follows from 1−H(τ)−x∗ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ) ≥ 0, c(x∗) is convex, and ∂x∗/∂n < 0.
Define θ(U¯(x∗, τ)) = (1−H(τ)) / (ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)). Diﬀerentiating the firm’s equilibrium
profit with respect to U¯(x∗, τ) and abbreviating notation, we have
∂Π∗
∂U¯
=
Ã
1− x∗ρ(x∗, τ)−H(τ) + ρ(x∗, τ) (1−H(τ)) ∂x∗
∂U¯
ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)
!
c0(x∗) + θc00(x∗)
∂x∗
∂U¯
. (16)
The above derivative cannot be signed unambiguously. Let consider the linear cost function
c(x) = cx with c0(x) = c. Then, (16) becomes
∂Π∗
∂U¯
=
Ã
1− x∗ρ(x∗, τ)−H(τ) + x∗ρ(x∗, τ) (1−H(τ)) ρ0(x
∗,τ)
µ
ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ)
!
c0(x∗) + θc00(x∗)
∂x∗
∂U¯
.
For ρ0(x
∗, τ)/µ = 1, the numerator of the term inside the parentheses becomes 1−H(τ)−
x∗ρ(x∗, τ)H(τ) ≥ 0, which makes ∂Π∗/∂U¯(x∗, τ) ≥ 0. All terms in the numerator are
independent of x∗ except the term ρ0(x
∗, τ). Because w(x∗) in condition (31) is increas-
ing in u0 and quasi-convex with w(0) = 0, x∗ is decreasing in u0. Hence, ρ0(x
∗, τ) =
exp
¡
−
¡¡
U¯(x∗, τ)− p∗ − u0
¢
/µ+ γ
¢¢
is increasing in u0. Thus, the numerator inside the
parentheses is more likely to be positive in which case ∂Π∗/∂U¯ ≥ 0 is more likely to hold,
which implies easier search does not necessarily reduce the equilibrium firm profit.¥
Proof of Proposition 9: Using the definition of U¯ (x∗, τ), the conditional expected net
utility for a consumer enters the market and search is
E[consumer utility|search] =
Z ∞
U¯(x∗,τ)
ξdH (ξ)− τ
(1−H (τ)) − p
∗
= U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗.
Thus, the expected consumer welfare is
CW = H0
¡
U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗
¢ ¡
U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗
¢
+
Z ∞
U¯(x∗,τ)−p∗
ξh0 (ξ) dξ
= E
£
max
£
U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗, U0
¤¤
,
where U0 is the utility of consumer’s no-purchase option which is a random variable with CDF
H0 and pdf h0. It is clearly that E
£
max
£
U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗, U0
¤¤
is increasing in U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗.
Therefore, consumer welfare CW increases as search cost τ decreases since U¯ (x∗, τ) increases
and p∗ decreases as τ decreases. As more firms enter the market, U¯ (x∗, τ) decreases since
x∗ decreases, and p∗ is unchanged. As a result, U¯ (x∗, τ) − p∗ decreases. Therefore, firm
entry always reduces consumer welfare.
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The social welfare is
SW = H0
¡
U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗
¢
U¯ (x∗, τ) +
Z ∞
U¯(x∗,τ)−p∗
ξh0 (ξ) dξ − nc (x∗) .
To simplify notation, we use the following abbreviations: h0 = h0
¡
U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗
¢
, H0 =
H0
¡
U¯ (x∗, τ)− p∗
¢
, and U¯ = U¯ (x∗, τ). Diﬀerentiating with respect to x∗ and collecting
terms, we have
∂SW
∂x∗
= H0
∂U¯
∂x∗
+ p∗h0
∂U¯
∂x∗
− nc0 (x∗) .
From (13), we know H0 = nx∗c0 (x∗) /µ, and in the proof of Lemma 5 we have shown that
∂U¯
∂x∗ = µ/x
∗. Therefore, ∂SW/∂x∗ simplifies to
∂SW
∂x∗
= p∗h0
∂U¯
∂x∗
≥ 0.
Since x∗ increases as search costs decrease, it implies that social welfare also increases as
search costs decrease. Numerical studies show that social welfare is not monotone in n, i.e.,
firm entry may reduce or increase social welfare.¥
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